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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to test econometrically the existence of fiscal interactions
between Belgian municipalities. At the time of writing, the motivation was to provide
scientific support to the lively debate on fiscal competition that took place among Belgian
politicians in the late nineties.
Two types of taxes are considered, for which Belgian municipalities have the decision
power as to rates: the "centimes additionnels" on the personal income tax and the "précompte
immobilier" which is a property tax. A dynamic adjustment model is specified and estimated
using panel data for 598 municipalities over 15 years.
The  empirical  results  obtained  bear  upon  two  main  points:  (i)  Some interaction
definitely  has  prevailed  between  the  municipalities'  fiscal  choices  made  during  the
observation period, for both taxes; (ii) However, the adjustment reactions to the other
municipalities' fiscal choices have occurred over time at the very low yearly pace of 6% and
10%, respectively, of the discrepancy between the actual rates and the preferred rates.
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
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1 Introduction and review of the literature
Tax interaction occurs when the taxation decisions taken by one independent authority are
influenced by the taxation decisions of neighbouring authorities. We see two possible sources
of this type of interaction. The first is tax competition. In this case the transmission channel
for  tax  interaction  is  the  geographic  mobility  of  tax  bases:  by  using  tax  instruments,
governments attempt to acquire a mobile tax base. Their interest in doing this is to increase
their income (or not to decrease it), and to benefit from the advantages linked to the presence
of these tax bases (more investment, more jobs, etc). The second source of tax interaction is
tax mimicry for political reasons. In this case, it is not the mobility of tax bases that forms the
transmission channel, but the fear of the political decision-makers of being penalised by their
electorate if their tax decisions are seen as being worse than their neighbours. These two
sources of tax interaction are analysed from a theoretical point of view, according to two
distinct streams of thought in the literature: tax competition and tax mimicry, sometimes
called “yardstick competition”.
The objective of this article is to empirically test the existence of tax interactions in
Belgium,  at  the  local  government  level,  i.e.  the  municipalities
1.  It  is  thus  not  about
determining the channel through which these interactions are transmitted
2.
There is nascent empirical literature aimed at testing the presence of tax interactions.
We have listed eight articles that attempt to answer the following question: “Do political
decision-makers take account of the decisions of their neighbours when making their tax
choices, and if yes, to what extent?” All these articles, except one, are based on North
American data. The majority examine the choices in terms of tax rates, and one of them
examines the choices in terms of expenditure (Case, Rosen and Hines, 1993). Different types
of taxes are considered: personal income tax (Heyndels and Vuchelen 1996, Goodspeed 1999,
and  Case  1993),  corporate  income  tax  (Masayoshi  and  Boadway,  2000),  wealth  tax
(Brueckner and Saavedra 1999), excises (Besley and Rosen, 1998) and the tax burden as a
whole (Ladd, 1992).
The empirical studies always include a reminder of the theoretical foundations of the
phenomenon studied. They cover the two aforementioned streams: tax competition
3, and
yardstick competition. When the authors consider taxes on mobile bases (wealth tax or
                                                   
1 This exercise was done in order to shed scientific and empirical light on the debate concerning tax competition
that took place in Belgium during the institutional negotiations of October 2000. The issue of increased fiscal
autonomy of the Regions was a central one. A detailed account of these negotiations and their results is given in
Van der Stichele and Verdonck (2001).
2 The reader interested in empirical studies bearing specifically on the mobility of tax bases should read the
articles of Feld and Kirschgässner (2000), Goodspeed (1999) as well as  Heyndels and Vuchelen (1989).
3 For a recent review of the theoretical literature on tax competition see Wilson (1999).2
indirect taxes), their empirical study is generally preceded by a theoretical model of tax
competition. When they look at taxes on less mobile bases (tax on income from labour), their
empirical study is sometimes preceded by a theoretical model of the yardstick competition
type.
Irrespective of the basic theoretical model adopted to study the existence of tax
interaction, the specification of the econometric model to perform the test it is the same. In
fact, the variable to be explained is the rate chosen by the entities considered, and the equation
to be estimated is a linear equation containing the socio-economic variables of the entity
concerned, as well as the rates of the neighbouring entities. The major variant among the
estimated equations concerns the method for weighting the rates of neighbouring entities, in
order to account for the fact that an entity can be more strongly influenced by certain entities
and less so by others.
In these articles, the presence of tax interaction is accepted if significant coefficients
are obtained for the explanatory variables, which are the rates of neighbouring entities. The
studies conclude by noticing the existence of significant interaction between entities at the
same level of government, with this interaction being positive in the vast majority of cases.
The results indicate that the estimated coefficient for the rates of neighbouring municipalities
is of the order of 0.6 on average. Several authors end their studies with the following
interpretation: “If all neighbours of entity i increase their tax rates by 1%, entity i will
increase its tax rate by 0.6%”.
For  the  following  reasons,  we  believe  that  this  interpretation  is  incorrect.  The
previously mentioned studies analyse the problem statically, i.e. one year at a time. The data
themselves often only relate to a single year, and if several years are considered, the analysis
is done for each year separately. This means that the econometric results obtained implicitly
assume that each municipality is able to effectively adopt its preferred rate of tax in the year
of observation, given the rates of its neighbours. To us, this hypothesis seems to be too strong,
and above all untenable if, as we have been able to do here, the analysis is done over a large
number of consecutive years. In this context we cannot ignore varying adjustment times in the
decision-making process. This thus has to be taken into account when evaluating the actual
tax interaction phenomenon.
That is why we specify a dynamic model that explicitly takes adjustment time into
account. The observed changes in the tax rates will then be interpreted as trends towards a rate
that we call the municipality’s “preferred rate” - rate that is subject to external influences such
as the rates of the other municipalities, or even other economic variables that play a role in
fiscal decisions. Thus, each rate change observed will not be interpreted as resulting from tax
interactions, but as a movement towards the preferred rate. It is in the level of this rate that the
presence of tax interactions is explicitly acknowledged as a possibility. That this presence can
be detected in the facts is precisely what this econometric estimate aims to verify.
The analysis is organised as follows. A model of the assumed tax behaviour of each
municipality is specified in section 2. The data used for the empirical analysis are described in
section 3. The econometric method used is contained in section 4. The results of the estimates
and their econometric interpretation are presented in section 5. Section 6 presents a summary
and draws conclusions from the study.
2 Specification of the economic model
The model assumed to describe the behaviour of municipalities in the choice of their tax rates
is set out in two stages. We start by defining the tax rate that we call the “preferred rate” of a
local entity, and then describe an adjustment process over time towards this preferred rate.3
We present a model in terms of a single tax. When more than one type of tax is used,
the model is assumed to apply to each tax separately.
2.1 The preferred rate in the absence of tax interaction
First suppose that for each municipality i there is a tax rate 
*
,t i T that it would apply in year t if it
did not have to take any account of the other municipalities. It would choose this rate
according to the economic conditions that we will represent by a vector Zi,t of miscellaneous
variables, and also by considering the tax rate set by a different level of authority on the same
basis  TF,t. This last element takes account of any vertical tax interaction between the
municipalities and the other levels of government (regional or federal for Belgium). We
summarise these conditions by specifying the equation
(1)  F i i T Z T α β + ′ =
∗
where the time index has been omitted because it is not essential at this stage, α is a scalar and
β a vector of the same dimension as Zi. We will call 
*
i T the “preferred rate of the municipality
i in the absence of tax interaction”
4.
However, during the period studied, the relevant tax rates of the other levels of
government did not change or only changed once, which does not allow their impact to be
measured. We will thus ignore them and replace (1) by
(2)  i i Z T β′ =
∗
2.2 The preferred rate in the presence of tax interaction
In order to take account of any tax interactions between municipalities, we amend the concept
of preferred rate that has just been presented, by alternatively taking “the preferred tax rate of
municipality i, in year t, in the presence of tax interactions”, denoting it as  t i T ,
~
 and writing the




































                                                   
4 It is not an optimum rate as we do not derive it from a model of optimisation. Such an exercise would certainly
be desirable, but would be part of a different study.4
where Tj is the actual rate of tax of the same type applied by municipality j, while  ii φ  and
ij φ measure the influence on the tax decisions of municipality i of, respectively, its preferred
rate without tax interaction, and the tax decisions of the other municipalities,. The numerical
value of 
€ 
φij represents the degree of “neighbourliness” between i and j. We suppose that the
influence of the one on the other increases in relation to this. Without any tax interaction from










∑ =1 and thus
€ 
˜  T  i = φij
j≠i
∑ Tj
Entity i then only chooses its rate on the basis of the influence that it is subject to from the
neighbouring entities.
If all 589 municipalities are considered, and thus equation (3) as a system of 589
equations, the set of coefficients  ij φ  is a square 589 x 589 matrix that we will call the
“external rate weighting matrix for the choice of preferred rates of municipalities”, or more
briefly “weighting matrix”. Depending on the definition of the term “neighbouring”, we will
have different matrices of weights made up of the corresponding  ij φ .





∑ =1 expresses the desired rate as a convex combination of
the preferred rate without competition and the rates of the neighbouring entities
5.
2.3 Dynamic adjustment towards the preferred rate
We will now denote Ti,t as the rate actually applied by municipality i in year t, thus the
observed rate. It could be considered that this rate is the preferred rate, i.e. that Ti,t =  t i T,
~
 and
this for all t. But this hypothesis would be very optimistic regarding the speed and flexibility
of tax decision-making in the municipal institution - too optimistic probably. To us, it would
seem more realistic to describe the behaviour of decision-makers over time by incorporating
the possibility of an adjustment time between the applied rate and the preferred rate.
To this end we will adopt an error correction model (ECM). This type of model has
been used with considerable success in the theoretical and empirical literature on dynamic
                                                   
5 This condition is an identification constraint imposed by the fact that the rates  * i T  are not observed, and must
be estimated or reconstructed from single observations. We note that the model does not change if  * i T is
multiplied by an arbitrary constant k and  ii φ  is divided by the same constant. This implies that the estimators of
the coefficients of  * i T are only defined up to a constant of proportionality. An identification constraint thus has to
be imposed for each  ii φ , or equivalently for each line of the matrix of  ij φ ’s.  ii φ = 1 could for example have been
imposed, but it seemed more natural to us to impose that the sum of each line of  ij φ is equal to 1.5
adjustments in the direction of long-term equilibrium solutions, in the presence of adjustment
costs
6.
We use the standard notation Δto represent first differences (for example, ΔTi,t = Ti,t -
Ti,t-1). In the context of our problem, a formulation of the MEC type is written as follows:
(5)  )
~
( 1 , 1 , , , − − − − Δ ′ + = Δ t i t i t i t i T T v Z b a T
The central coefficient of the ECM model is v, which represents the instantaneous
fraction (speed) of adjustment, at a previous disequilibrium, between the actual rate and
preferred rate. For any value of v, strictly between 0 and 1, this model converges to a long-
term equilibrium in the (hypothetical) scenario of stationarity (ΔZi,t = 0), or even of balanced
growth (ΔZi,t = gi, where gi designates a growth rate). It is more a theoretical property than an
empirical property, as in practice one does not expect to observe a balanced growth of ΔZi,t.
Of course, as the preferred rates  t i T,
~
are not observed, equation (5) cannot be estimated
as such. Equations (2) and (3) have to be substituted for  t i T,
~




















where εi,t represents the usual error term, assumed to average zero and to be uncorrelated with
the regressors (the discrete character of the data implies truncation effects to be discussed in
section 4.4 below).
2.4 The weighting matrix
It thus remains for us to model the 589 x 589 “weighting” matrix φ = ( ij φ ). To do this, we
adopt a standard logistic formulation in which the logarithms of the  ij φ ’s are assumed to be
proportional to a linear combination (with weights δ) of “socio-economic distance” variables

























ij φ  to be satisfied.
After optimisation with respect to δ, it is possible to calculate  ij φ for each pair ij, and  ii φ is then









                                                   
6 The interested reader here can consult the fundamental contributions of Sargan (1964), Hendry and Anderson
(1977), Davidson, Hendry, Sbra and Yeo (1978), or Nickell (1985).6
The choice of the quantities dij is discussed in section 3.2 below. Two comments apply
to the specification of the  ij φ ’s:
1. Given the relatively short observation period (14 years), we have limited ourselves to
measures of distance which are constant over time (even if this means using sample
averages over the observation period), which explains the absence of the index t for dij
and  ij φ . There is no conceptual obstacle to using measures of distance that vary in
time, but in practice it comes down to calculating a 589 x 589 matrix per year. In our
opinion, this is not necessary considering that the subsequent variations selected to
calculate dij would only lead to small changes in ij φ over time.
2. In the course of the analysis, we examined the question of whether or not the fact of
belonging to regions with the same or different languages has an impact on our
proximity measurements. There are at least two ways of examining this question. The
first consists of adding a dichotomic variable Iij to the list of dij, which takes the value
0 if i and j belong to the same linguistic region, and 1 in the opposite case. A richer
model would consist of introducing different values for δ according to the value of Iij,
i.e. δ1 for Iij = 1 and δ2 for Iij = 0. In practice, this comes down to replacing δ in
equation (7) with:
€ 
δij =δ1Iij +δ2(1− Iij)
It turned out that the differences between δ1 and δ2 were not significant, and this
formulation was thus abandoned in favour of a single δ common to all pairs of
municipalities.
To summarise this section, the model to be estimated is completely characterised by
equations (6) and (7).
3 Data and choice of variables
As  already  mentioned  in  Heyndels  and  Vuchelen  (1996),  Belgium  has  a  series  of
characteristics that make it an ideal subject for an empirical study of this type. Firstly, the
number of municipalities in Belgium gives us a large sample, as we can work with 589
municipalities each year. Secondly, for all the municipalities only two types of tax, namely
the supplements on the personal income tax (hereafter, IPP supplements) and the supplements
on  the  property  tax  (hereafter,  PrI  supplements),  make  up  the  bulk  of  municipal  tax
resources
7. Thirdly, as these two taxes are additional (“piggyback”) to a federal tax and to a
regional tax, respectively, the definition of the tax base is entirely uniform because in these
two cases it is determined at a higher level. Consequently, we can compare the rates without
having to adapt the bases. Finally, the internal borderlines that demarcate the different
                                                   
7 Tax revenue represents 40% of the total municipal income, and the two taxes mentioned above constitute more
than 80% of this tax revenue. The rest of the revenue consists of non-tax revenue and grants. For further
information, see Flohimont (1999). The acronym IPP stands for Impôt des Personnes Physiques in Belgian tax
terminology; similarly, PrI stands for  Précompte Immobilier.7
responsibilities, including responsibility for tax, of the entities in question are exactly the
same. The municipalities are thus institutionally homogeneous. Note that these last three
elements facilitate intermunicipal comparisons, both for the taxpayers and for the political
decision-makers.
All the data used in the estimate are available for all municipalities for the years 1983
to 1997. The main sources of these data are the National Institute of Statistics, the Ministry of
Finance, and the Department of Geography of the Catholic University of Louvain.
We will now describe the data used to estimate equation (6), successively for the IPP
supplements and for the PrI supplements.
3.1 The tax variables
The IPP supplements are set by each municipality as a percentage of the tax due by the
taxpayer to the federal authority
8. The supplement is expressed in ‘centimes’ where one
centime is one percent of the tax due. The tax base for this federal tax is all the comprehensive
income of the taxpayers. The supplements vary from one municipality to the next, between 0
and 10%, with an average of 6.7% for the whole country.
By contrast, the PrI supplements are expressed by each municipality as a number of
hundredths of the PrI rate. If the PrI rate is 1.25%, the supplement, expressed in terms of
‘centimes’ is here 0.01 x 0.0125, a figure that is added to the PrI rate applied to the taxpayer.
The tax base for the PrI is the imputed income from the property that the taxpayer owns, an
income that is calculated by the (federal) tax department on the basis of objective criteria such
as area, year of construction, etc.
The municipal PrI supplements vary from 200 to 4000 from one municipality to the
next.  The  PrI  rate  itself  varies  according  to  the  region  (because  it  is  a  regional  tax
competence): 1.25% in Wallonia and Brussels, and 2.5% in Flanders. 200 centimes thus do
not correspond to the same actual tax rate, as it depends on the region where they apply.
Consequently, and in order to express the municipal PrI supplements in comparable units
across the whole country, it was necessary to convert the figures of these centimes. The rate
of municipal property tax, thus re-expressed as a percentage of the tax base (the imputed
income), varies between 2.5% and 50%, with an average of 24.65%.
3.2 The non-tax explanatory variables
The introduction of non-tax explanatory variables enables us to distinguish, between the
similarities  in  rates  between  municipalities,  those  which  are  due  to  socio-economic
characteristics from those due to tax interactions.
In order to choose explanatory socio-economic variables, we will use previous studies
and make the hypothesis that the set of variables to be used
9 is not changed by the dynamic
aspect introduced here.
In the first set of estimates, we introduced nine explanatory variables, identical for the
IPP estimates and the PrI estimates. The estimates then enable us to select the variables which
are most relevant for each tax.
                                                   
8 A consequence of this form of municipal supplement” is that when the tax burden changes at the federal level,
the municipal tax revenue changes in the same proportion.
9 Of course this choice of socio-economic variables is also dictated by the availability of data.8
The first socio-economic variable taken into account is the municipal population. In
1997, the number of residents per municipality varied from 85 in Herstappe to 453,030 in
Antwerp, with an average of 18,000 in Belgium.
The  second  variable  is  the  population  density. The most densely populated
municipality is in the Brussels region, with 191.8 residents per hectare is Saint-Josse and the
least densely populated municipality is Léglise, with a density of 0.209. The Belgian average
is 6.7. We interpret this measure as an approximation of the level of urbanisation of the
municipality.
The third variable is income per resident in each municipality. In 1983, the poorest
municipality, Bertogne, had an annual taxable income per resident of BEF 137,100 (3,999
euros) and the richest was Kraainem with BEF 335,500 (8,317 euros). In 1998, the gap had
widened, with the minimum being BEF 192,000 (4,762 euros) per resident in Saint-Josse, and
the maximum being BEF 593,200 (14,705 euros) in Lathem-Saint-Martin. The national
average was BEF 394,800 (9,787 euros).
Three regional dichotomic variables have also been added to observe whether the
rates vary significantly from one region to the next, for reasons other than changes in the
socio-economic characteristics included in the model.
For the weights of neighbouring municipalities, four types of “distances” have been
introduced: the first is the geographic distance from centre to centre, the second is the income
per resident differential between two municipalities i and j, the third is the population
density differential between i and j, and finally the last is the population differential. The
choice of these variables for the weights of the municipalities results from the hypothesis that
if there is tax mimicry or tax competition, it is because there is, at a given point in time, a
comparison of the rates by the political decision-makers or by the taxpayers. This comparison
is assumed to be more direct, not only between geographically close municipalities, but also
between municipalities with similar characteristics in terms of level of urbanisation, size of
population, or income classes.
Table 1 below gives the units in which the explained and explanatory variables are
expressed.
Table 1. Variables, symbols and units
Variable Symbol Unit
Rate of PrI supplement
Rate of IPP supplement





























Note: BEF 1,000 equals 24.79 euros.9
4. Econometric method
4.1 Estimation technique
The model defined by equations (6) and (7) is non-linear in the parameters v, β and δ. The
non-linearity in (v, β) is eliminated by reparametrising (6) as follows):
(8) 
€ 










where c = v.β. We thus have a linear expression in coefficients (a, b, c, v), conditionally to δ
and thus to 
€ 
φij. Taking this property of the model into consideration will enable us to
considerably  simplify  the  calculation  of  non-linear
10  least-squares  estimators  for  all
parameters of the model, including δ.
Indeed, for any given value of δ, it is sufficient to calculate the  ij φ ’s corresponding to
it, to substitute them in equation (8), and to estimate the remaining coefficients by ordinary
least squares. We then search for the numerical values of δ that minimise the sum of the
squares of the (estimated) residues of equation (8).
This numerical optimisation programme is written in FORTRAN 77 and uses a very
powerful optimisation subroutine based on the simplex method and adapted from Press et al
(1966). A complete optimisation calculation takes the order of 25 seconds on a SUNFIRE
3800 workstation.
Before presenting in section 5 the results of the estimate, we have to discuss in the
following subsections three essential complementary aspects of the least squares analysis: in
subsection 4.2, the statistical calibration of the estimators thus obtained in the form of
standard deviations (or of confidence intervals); in subsection 4.3, a selection procedure for
the explanatory variables, in order to eliminate the insignificant variables; and in subsection
4.4,  the effects of truncation.
4.2 Confidence intervals
The uncertainty inherent in the random nature of the observed sample has to be suitably
characterised. This is generally done in the form of standard deviations that measure the
statistical dispersion of the estimators. Given the non-linearity of the model, there is no
analytical expression for these standard deviations. It is certainly possible to calculate
approximations of them, called large sample ones (or asymptotic), but this is at the cost of
calculations that can turn out to be awkward.
In this case, we have preferred to use simulation techniques, which with a minimum
programming effort enable us to obtain standard deviations corresponding to the actual size of
the samples used.
This technique essentially consists of assigning their estimated values to the model
parameters and then taking random samples of the error terms εi,t, and by substitution in
equation  (6)  then  deriving  fictitious  samples  of  variations  of  the  tax  rates  (or  more
                                                   
10 Under the hypothesis of normality of the residues εi,t, the method of non-linear least squares coincides with
the method of maximum likelihood. As we discuss below, the hypothesis of normality of residues is clearly not
satisfied in this application.10
specifically, given the dynamic nature of the model, fictitious trajectories of tax rates over the
14 years of our sample). Of course the explanatory variables Zi,t, which are not part of the
modelling and are exogenous, are kept at their observed value.
The estimation technique described above was applied to each fictitious sample thus
obtained (of the size 589 x 14 = 8246). For each specification of the model we repeated this
simulation  procedure  1000  times,  and  thus  obtained  1000  random  realisations  of  the
estimation process. Finally, the standard deviations of these 1000 realisations were calculated,
thereby obtaining a reliable statistical measure of the statistical dispersion of the estimators
(also verifying that the empirical averages of the simulated estimators do not significantly
differ from the values selected for the simulation, i.e. the estimators are not significantly
biased). The confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients are thus defined as half-length
intervals corresponding to two standard deviations, centred on the estimated value of the
coefficient.
The validation of this simulation technique of course depends on hypotheses relating
to the distribution of the error terms εi,t, as it is from this distribution that the simulated errors
will be drawn. An examination of the estimated residues of the model leads us to reject the
standard  hypothesis  of  normality  of  residues.  More  specifically,  we  observe  a  strong
concentration (80 to 90%) of low residues, accompanied by a small number of often more
dispersed residues. Under these conditions, simulations under a hypothesis of normality
would lead to excessive concentrations of small simulated unknowns and consequently an
excessive “confidence” in the estimated values of the coefficients.
Under these conditions we used a “bootstrap” simulation method, which consists of
sampling the unknowns _i,t in their empirical distribution, as obtained using estimators of the
coefficients. More precisely, an estimate of the model would produce 8246 estimated
residues, which are each allocated a probability of 1/8246 for the simulation procedure
(selection with replacement).
4.3 Selection of the explanatory variables
We initially have a total of 12 explanatory variables: three for the short term (the  ΔZi,t’s ),
five for the long term (the Zi,t-1’s, complemented by two indicator variables for Flanders and
Wallonia - which given the constant term a, amount to introducing a specific constant for
each of the three regions), and 4 variables for the weights  ij φ  (the four types of “distance”).
In order to simplify the statistical and economic interpretation of the results, it is
generally recommended eliminating variables from the model that do not significantly
contribute. In order to do this we start with the most general possible model by including all
the available explanatory variables, and then gradually eliminate the least significant ones
until  a  model  is  obtained  where  all  the  coefficients  are  statistically  significant.  This
elimination procedure is of course done separately for the PrI and IPP, as it can be expected
that the variables selected will be different in the two cases. The elimination criterion is the
usual criterion of the “t statistic” (ratio between the estimator and its standard deviation) being
less than two. This means that all the results presented below are significant in the sense of
the t statistic.
Finally, note that to accelerate the interactive selection procedure of variables, it is
legitimate to use the least-squares standard deviations rather than those obtained from
simulation. The first are lower than the second as, in particular, they do not take account of
the uncertainty of the δ’s and thus of the  ij φ ’s. It then follows that every variable eliminated
on the basis of least-squares standard deviations would also be eliminated on the basis of
standard deviations from the simulation. Of course, with regard to the dij, it is appropriate to11
use the simulation standard deviations, which are the only ones available, or, as a first
approximation, the R
2 statistic associated with the least-squares calculation.
4.4 Effects of truncation
A detailed examination of the data indicates that municipal tax rates are not continuous
variables, but are often rounded to specific fractions of points or to whole numbers of
additional centimes. The clearest demonstration of this phenomenon comes from the high
percentages of zero changes (82% of observations for the PrI supplements, and 87% for the
IPP supplements). More generally, the large majority of changes to the IPP rates are multiples
of 1/2% (between the extremes of - 6% and +6%). Similarly, the majority of changes to the
PrI are in multiples of 50 additional centimes (between the extremes of -1120 and +2120, both
not multiples of 50, and thus exceptional cases). This implicit discretisation raises questions
of interpretation and modelling. The most immediate question is whether it is liable to
markedly affect the estimates of the model represented by equation (6), in particular in the
form of a downward bias in the dynamic adjustment coefficient v (note that 100% zero
adjustments would be perfectly explained by all coefficients in this equation being zero).
The simulation techniques described above answer this question. It is sufficient to do
parallel simulations where the simulated tax rates are themselves rounded in order to be
representative of the sample observed, i.e. in multiples of 1/2% for the IPP supplements and
50 additional centimes for the PrI supplements.
In particular, we did truncated simulations of the two final versions (PrI and IPP) of
our model, as presented below. Without anticipating the detailed analysis of the results, we
will see that the dynamic adjustment coefficient v is biased downwards as a result of the
truncation (and more particularly, the high number of zero changes), but in a way that does
not change the essence of our qualitative conclusions relating to the slowness of the dynamic
adjustments towards the long-term equilibrium rates.
5 The results and their econometric interpretation
For the PrI supplements and for the IPP suplements, three categories of results have to be
considered. The first is made up of estimates of the parameters  ij φ , after optimisation of the δ
coefficients. The value of these parameters determines the importance that a municipality
attaches to its preferred rate without tax interaction  * ,t i T , as well as to the rates of other
municipalities, in the determination of its preferred rate in the presence of tax interactions  t i T,
~
,
and thus also in the choice of its actual rate of taxation  t i T, . In addition, these coefficients
identify what criteria determine the weight attached by one municipality to the rate of another.
The second category of results relates to the estimate of the fraction v of the difference
between the rate actually applied  t i T, , and the preferred rate with tax interaction  t i T,
~
, which is
corrected in each period.
Finally, the third category of results relates to the coefficients b and β of the non-tax
explanatory variables, with b indicating the effect of these variables on the actual annual
variations, and β measuring their impact on the long term preferred rate  t i T,
~
.12
5.1 Results for the property tax (PrI supplements)
Table 2 presents the values of the estimated coefficients in the equation for the property tax. It
only takes account of the significant variables. The explanatory variables cited in section 3.2
that do not appear in the table do not improve the quality of the estimate. We have thus
eliminated them.


































a The (simulation) t statistic is defined as the absolute value of the quotient between the
simulation average and its standard deviation.
b The floating decimal notation of FORTRAN guarantees 4 significant decimals for all
estimators.
c This is a gross R
2 (not corrected for truncation effects).









φ ’s are specific to each municipality, we cannot give them a value in this general
equation. That is why, for indicative purposes, we write it with the estimated coefficients for a
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Before going into a systematic examination of the coefficients, an important comment
concerning the R
2 of this estimate is in order. It shows that the predictive quality of the model
is particularly low, of the order of 3.6%. This is due to several factors. First of all, panel data
usually generate a low R
2. Secondly, the data are discrete while the model has been specified
for continuous variables. Thirdly, first differences are used. Finally the list of variables Zi
taken into consideration is clearly not exhaustive - it thus has to be completed.
a) The value of the  ij φ ’s
For the property tax, the optimisation of the value of the  ij φ ’s through the coefficients
δ, shows us that the geographic distance (DIS) and the population density differential
(DDEN) have a significant impact on the weight attached to the rate of another municipality
when choosing its own rate. This means that when deciding its supplement to the property tax
rate, a municipality i takes account of the tax rate supplements of the municipalities that (1°)
are not too far away in physical distance and (2°) are relatively comparable in terms of
population density. In other words, the importance that municipality i attaches to the rates
applied in j is inversely proportional to these two types of distance.
The significant nature of these two coefficients shows the importance of going a step
further than the studies mentioned in the review of the literature, and of not being limited to
the single criterion of geographic distance. Geographic distance plays a certain role, but it is
not the only one.
Thanks to these coefficients, it is possible to calculate the  ii φ  of each municipality, as
well as the  ij φ  of each pair of municipalities. The  ii φ ’s vary from 0.06 to 0.70 depending on
the municipality (with an average of 0.122). In the long term, 6 to 70% of the actual rate of
property tax of a municipality depends on its preferred rate without tax competition, and 30 to
94% on the rate of the closest municipalities in distance and in population density.
For municipality xl in particular (see equation (10)), we interpret the results in the
following way: 25.4% of the preferred long term rate in the presence of tax interaction  t xl T ,
~
depends on its preferred rate in the absence of tax interaction  *,
~
t xl T  (and thus on its specific
socio-economic characteristics), and 74.6% on the rate of neighbouring municipalities.
An examination of the individual  ii φ ’s shows that the  ii φ ’s of the municipalities of the
Brussels region are relatively large on average (the Brussels average is 0.282): compared with
the Flemish and Walloon municipalities, the municipalities of the capital are less influenced
by their neighbours and they attach relatively more importance to their preferred rate without
tax interaction. The reason for this specific Brussels characteristic could come from important
externalities between these municipalities and the peripheral municipalities in terms of public
goods and services. In fact a quarter of the daytime users of Brussels infrastructure are
commuters from the suburbs
11. Another specific aspect of the Brussels region that could
explain this difference in behaviour is the very dense structure as well as the value of its real
estate.
The specific character of the Brussels  ii φ ’s reinforces our idea that an increase in the
number of explanatory variables, and in particular those concerning the supply of public
goods and services as well as the value of the real estate, would markedly improve the
predictive value of our model.
The estimated coefficients of equation (10) show the following:
                                                   
11 See LAMBERT, TULKENS et al. (1999)14
1. With equal population density differentials (=DDEN) and with distances of, say, 20
km between i and j, and 50 km between i and h, the weight attached by i to j is 21.7 times
larger than the weight attached by i to h.
2. With equal distances, and with a population density differential between i and j
equal  to  10  residents/km
2  and  a  similar  differential  between  i and h  equal  to  200
residents/km
2, the weight attached by i to j is 124 times greater than the weight attached by i
to h.
Remember that the sum of the  ij φ ’s is equal to 1 and that there are 589  ij φ ’s. Each one
is thus very small, and the weight attached to the municipalities further away, in distance or in
terms of population density differential, rapidly tends towards 0.
b) The value of the adjustment coefficient v
The estimated adjustment coefficient is 0.0612 and is highly significant. This value
means that when in municipality i a difference is observed at time t between its actual rate Ti,t-
1 and its preferred rate  1 ,
~
− t i T , this municipality adjusts its actual rate at time t by 2.12% of
the observed difference. The dynamic adjustment is thus very slow.
One should also keep in mind that the preferred rate of the municipality  t i T,
~
 constantly
varies in relation to changes in the socio-economic characteristics of municipality i and the
rates of neighbouring municipalities.
It is also important to note that the specification of the model implies that this
adjustment coefficient is an average of the adjustments over time. In reality, it is generally
observed that municipalities keep their rate constant for a few years, and then make a change
larger than 6.12%. Such behaviour could be attributed to the fixed costs (administrative and
political) involved in a change of tax.
On the basis of these explanations, we can deepen the interpretation of equation (9)
specific to municipality xl in the following way. Let us make the hypothesis that all socio-
economic characteristics of municipality xl are constant over time (the preferred rate in the
absence of tax interactions is consequently fixed) and that the number of centimes in the PrI
supplements of all other municipalities is increased by 100 at time t - 1. Then, the preferred
long term equilibrium supplement of xl increases by 74.6 centimes, as the equation implies
that 74.6% of it depends on what happens in neighbouring municipalities. As to the actual
supplements, on average, municipality xl will make at time t an adjustment of 6.12% towards
this new equilibrium preferred rate, i.e. it will increase its PrI supplement by 4.55 centimes (=
6.12% x 74.6).
c) The value of the coefficients of the explanatory variables.
The socio-economic variables with significant coefficients in the equation for the PrI
supplements are the income per resident (REV) and the number of residents (POP). However,
these two variables act in different ways: the population variations influence the short-term
decisions through the vector of coefficients b, while the income per resident determines,
through the vector of coefficients β, the level of the long term preferred rate  t i T,
~
 and the (very)
gradual adjustment towards it.
We will not dwell on the interpretation of the short term coefficient b, as it is not a key
parameter in our model. Moreover, as we have said, the predictive value of the model is low
and makes the interpretation of short term movements awkward.15
Instead, let us look at the coefficient β determining the long term objective. If, for a
municipality, the annual income per resident reaches, from time t on,  a permanent level of
5,000 francs higher than before, its preferred rate  t i T,
~
 is changed and increases by  ii φ x 5 x
0.4026, all other things remaining equal. In the specific case of municipality xl this rate  t x T ,
~
increases by 0.254 x 5 x 0.4026 = 0.51. In terms of additional centimes, this means that the
preferred long term rate increases by 25.5 (as the T’s are expressed in units of 50 centimes for
the PrI supplements). Given the estimated adjustment coefficient, the model predicts that the
municipality will adapt its actual rate towards this new preferred rate, by 25.5 x 0.06 = 1.53
centimes per year. The sign of this estimated coefficient can be seen as a confirmation of the
idea that the demand for public goods and services increases with income, and that the greater
supply  of  these  goods  and  services  requires  additional  financial  resources,  which  the
municipality can obtain through a higher tax burden.
5.2 Results for personal income tax (IPP supplements)
Table 3 shows values of the coefficients estimated in the equation for the IPP suppements.
Just like for the PrI supplements. Only significant variables are retained. The same comment
as in the previous section thus applies to R
2, which, although it has now a double value, is
nevertheless very low.





1 b DEN -0.8068D+01 2.691
2 b REV 0.4391D-02 4.390
c1  ) ( 1 β v
def = DEN 0.9495D+00 7.020
c2  ) ( 2 β v
def = POP 0.1.12D+01 4.285
c3  ) ( 3 β v
def = WAL 0.1217D+01 11.50
1 β DEN 0.9000D+01 7.072
2 β POP 0.9595D+01 3.923
3 β WAL 0.1153D+02 12.17
v 0.1055D+00 23.44
δ1 DIS 0.6630D+01 7.688




a, b, c, see table 2.16
The estimated coefficients for the IPP yield the following equation:
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a) The value of the 
€ 
φij’s
For  the  IPP  supplements,  the  estimate  of  δ  shows  that  it  is  the  rates  of  the
geographically close municipalities and those similar in terms of income per resident that
influence most the municipal choices. As with the property tax, we see that it was useful to
analyse in more detail the criteria to be considered in the definition of “neighbourliness”:
indeed, while we observe that the geographic distance plays the same role as shown by
previous studies, we see here too that it is not the only one. But our analysis shows that the
additional criterion to be considered differs according to the tax studied: income per resident
for the IPP supplements and population density for the PrI supplements.
For the IPP, the  ii φ ’s vary from 0.063 to 0.843, with an average of 0.140. In this case,
just as with the PrI, the average over the municipalities of the Brussels region average is
higher (0.173) than in the other regions but less markedly so.
The estimated coefficients of equation (12) show the following:
1. With equal income differentials (=DREV), and with distances of 20 km between i
and j and 50 km between i and h, the weight attached by i to j is 7.3 times larger than the
weight attached by i to h.
2. At equal distances, with an income differential between i and j equal to 20,000
BEF/resident, and the differential between i and h equal to 100,000 BEF/resident, the weight
attached by i to j is 67 times greater than the weight attached by i to h.
b) The value of the adjustment coefficient v
With the IPP supplements, the adjustment coefficient is 0.1055. When there is a
difference between its actual rate and its long term equilibrium rate, municipality i adjusts its
actual rate, annually and on average, by 10% of this difference. Just as with the adjustment17
coefficient for  the PrI  supplements, the coefficient for  the IPP  supplements is  highly
significant.
It is interesting to note that the speed of adjustment is greater with IPP than with PrI
supplements. Two interpretations are possible. On the one hand, it can be attributed to the fact
that the tax base for the IPP, which is the income of the taxpayer
12, is more mobile than with
the PrI, the registered income of the building
13. On the other hand, we can see there an
indication of the fact that tax interaction in IPP supplements and tax interaction in PrI
supplements do not occur through the same transmission channels, and thus do not give rise to
the same rates of adjustment.
c) The value of the coefficients of the explanatory variables
A distinction again has to be made between the socio-economic characteristics that
influence the short term tax rate and those that influence the long term preferred rate. Among
the variables with a short term effect, are the population density and the income per resident.
Among the variables with an effect on the long term equilibrium rate, are the population
density and the number of residents, and being in Wallonia.
For the same reasons as those given for the PrI supplements, we will not look at the
short term aspect. However, we do have to make one comment concerning the explanatory
variable “population density”, which has both a short term and long term effect with
coefficients of opposite signs. When the density increases, the model predicts that the IPP rate
adjusts  downwards  in  the  short  term.  In  the  long  term  however,  the  pressure  on  the
equilibrium rate is upwards. The population density thus plays an ambiguous role on public
needs and goods: a higher density can have a downward impact on taxation because of
economies of scale in the supply of services, but a high density can also lead to needs linked
to congestion, security, etc.
Among the socio-economic variables with an impact on the preferred long term rate,
three are significant: the population density, the number of residents and the regional
dichotomic variable for Wallonia. When the first two incur a permanent level change, the
preferred long term rate is changed.




 increases by  ii φ  x 1 x 9. In the case of municipality xl, which has a 
€ 
φxl,xl of 0.38,  t i T,
~
increases by 3.5. This means that if its preferred rate was 6%, the new preferred rate after an
increase in the population density goes to 6 + 1.7 = 7.7% (note: the units for the IPP
supplements are 1/2%, which is why  i T
~  has to be divided by 2 for the interpretation). Note, it
is the new preferred long term rate; in fact, the municipality will only adjust annually at a rate
of 10%, as the estimated v is 0.1055.
On the other hand, with all other things equal, if POPi increases by 1000 residents,
then  t i T,
~
 increases by  i i, φ  x 0.01 x 9.59. If municipality i has an average  i i, φ , i.e. 0.38, the  t i T,
~
increases by 0.038. This means that if the preferred rate was 6%, the new preferred rate after
the population increase goes to 6.019% (same comment as above). Again, the municipality
will only adjust to this new long term rate at a pace of 10% per year.
For the interpretation of the regional dichotomic variable coefficient, remember that it
is the difference between a Walloon municipality and a municipality of another region. We
                                                   
12 The IPP is located in the municipality where the taxpayer lives.
13 The PrI is located in the municipality where the building is located.18
can then say that on average, if municipality i is Walloon, and has an average  i i, φ , i.e. 0.14,
then its preferred long term rate is (0.14 x 1 x 11.53)/2 = 0.807 higher than the rate of a non-
Walloon municipality that has the same  i i, φ . The introduction of regional dichotomic variables
thus shows that the fact of belonging to the Walloon region systematically implies higher
rates than the other regions, with all other things being equal. It could be that DEN and POP
are lower on average for the Walloon municipalities than for the Flemish and Brussels
municipalities. In this case, the effect of WAL could only serve to counterbalance these
differences. This result could also indicate that other characteristics specific to the Walloon
region have not been taken into account in our explanatory variables, such as specific needs of
these municipalities relating to social protection, for example.
6 Summary and conclusions
The objective of this article was to econometrically test the existence of tax interactions
between Belgian municipalities. Two types of tax that the municipalities have control over
have been considered: supplements to personal income tax (IPP) and supplements to the
property tax (PrI). A dynamic model has been specified and estimated from panel data of 589
Belgian municipalities over a 15 year period.
The results obtained essentially relate to two points. On the one hand, they show
evidence of interaction between municipalities in the choices of the rates of the two taxes
during the period studied. This interaction is all the more important when the municipalities
are close and similar (a new finding from this study). With regard to IPP supplements, it is the
similarity in terms of income per resident that matters, whereas for the PrI supplements  it is
the similarity in terms of population density that counts.
On the other hand, thanks to the dynamic specification introduced here, it has been
possible to see that adjustments in response to the rates of other municipalities only occur
slowly. For the property tax supplements, the difference between the applied rate and the
desired rate due to interactions is reduced by only 6% per year. Thus 15 years is required
before the preferred rate is reached, which in the meantime is liable to have changed. For the
IPP supplements, this gap is reduced at 10% per year.
It can be concluded that while tax interaction between municipalities - the only one
observable in Belgium - is not absent in this country with IPP and PrI supplements, its
importance  is  low,  arguably  too  low  to  constitute  a  clear  and  major  obstacle  to  the
implementation of tax decentralisation policies in general.
In this perspective, it should be pointed out that the model is open to other uses, in
particular for the purpose of simulating coordinated municipal tax policies. It could be a
major extension of the work presented here, that our methodological results be used to
prepare cooperation decisions aimed at tax harmonisation between the institutions involved, a
perspective that seems to be sorely missing from the current debates.
Finally, the specification of the model could be improved, mainly by better modelling
the “discrete” (time) nature of the tax decision process, and also by using a simultaneous
estimate of the equations that model the two taxes. These extensions would increase the
explanatory value of the model.19
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